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INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: TO LITIGATE OR
LEGISLATE?
Louis Fisher*
For most of U.S. history, little was done at the national or state level to
protect the religious practices of Indians. Initially they were to be "civilized,"
assimilated, and acculturated into American society. Later stages led to
exclusion of most Indians from the east coast, the creation of additional
reservations, and termination of federal responsibility for some tribes. Them
were few efforts by governmental institutions or private societies to safeguard
and preserve the unique religious beliefs of Indian tribes. To the extent that
religion played a part, it was to provide funds and assistance to convert
Indians to Christianity. Only in recent decades has the national government
taken steps to secure the religious heritage of Indians, and that initiative has
come largely from the political branches, not the courts. Any expansion of
Indian rights is most likely to come from statutes, presidential leadership,
agency regulations, and the political process.
L Propagating the Gospel
By the time of the American Revolution, religious missions to the Indians
had been operating in America for more than a century.' The first Virginia
charter of 1606 directed colonists to be active in "propagating of Christian
Religion to such People... and may in time bring the Infidels and Savages,
living in those parts, to human Civility."' The Charter of Massachusetts Bay
in 1629 expressed the intention that the natives learn of "the Knowledg and
Obedience of the onlie true God and Sauior of Mankinde, and the Christian
Fayth.1
3
On February 5, 1776, the Continental Congress directed the commissioners
of Indian affairs to select individuals who would live among the Indians "and
instruct them in the Christian religion."' In 1785, the Continental Congress
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1. R. PIERCE BEAVER, fNTRoDUCnON TO NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH HISTORY (1983)
[hereinafter BEAVER, INTRODUCTION]; R. Pierce Beaver, Church, State, and the Indians: Indian
Missions in the New Nation, 4 J. CHURCH & STATE 11 (1962).
2. 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
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3. 3 id. at 1857.
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set aside land for the Moravian Brethren or the Society of the United
Brethren, for the purpose of "civilizing the Indians and promoting
Christianity.' 5 Those values carried over to the administration of George
Washington. His Secretary of War, Henry Knox, proposed on July 7, 1789
that missionaries "of excellent moral character" should be appointed to live
among the Indians. Their duties ranged far beyond religious instruction. They
would supply the implements of husbandry, the necessary stock for a farm,
and serve as "their friends and fathers.""
In 1796, Congress passed legislation that set aside three tracts of land for
the Society of United Brethren "for propagating the gospel among the
heathen."7 In 1803, William Henry Harrison, as governor of the Indiana
Territory, signed a treaty at Vincennes recognizing that the Kaskaskia tribe
had been baptized and received into the Catholic Church. The treaty promised
that the United States would provide one hundred dollars for the next seven
years to support a Catholic priest. Another sum of three hundred dollars
would help the tribe erect a church.'
The national government encouraged Indians to make a transition from a
nomadic, hunter state to a settled agricultural existence. A message by
President Thomas Jefferson to Congress on January 18, 1803, spoke of
various measures needed for Indian tribes. The first: "To encourage them to
abandon hunting, to apply to the raising stock, to agriculture, and domestic
manufacture, and thereby prove to themselves that less land and labor will
maintain them in this better than in their former mode of living."' Yet it was
Jefferson's initiative with the Louisiana Purchase, opening up a vast territory
to the west, that prepared the way for the forced removal policy of the 1830s
and 1840s."0 The theme of Indians tilling soil reappears in other presidential
messages. In his first annual message to Congress on December 2, 1817,
President James Monroe said that the hunter state, capable of existing only "in
the vast uncultivated desert," would necessarily yield to denser populations.
He was pleased that reservations of land to the tribes on Lake Erie had been
made "with a view to individual ownership among them and to the cultivation
of the soil by all.""
In 1819, Congress enacted legislation "for the purpose of providing against
the further decline and final extinction of the Indian tribes." In an effort to
[hcrCinafter JOURNALS].
S. 28 id. at 429-30 (1936); 34 id at 485-87 (1937).
6. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 54 (1834) [hereinafter PAPERS: INDIAN
AFFAIRS].
7. Act of June I, 1796, ch. 46, § 5, 1 Stat. 490, 491.
8. 1 PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 687.
9. 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 352 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1897-1925) [hereinafter RICHARDSON].
10. 1 id. at 257, 351.




introduce among the tribes "the habits and arts of civilization," the statute
authorized the President to employ individuals to instruct Indians "in the mode
of agriculture suited to their situation," and to teach their children in reading,
writing, and arithmetic.'" Congress pledged $10,000 annually for this
purpose. There was little legislative debate on what has come to be known as
the "civilization fund."' 3 Although the statute and the legislative history make
no mention of instructing Indians in the tenets of Christianity, that became a
key objective. Monroe and his Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, used the
money to support the effort of missionaries and religious societies brought in
to establish schools for Indian children."
President John Quincy Adams told Congress in 1828 that "it was our
policy and our duty to use our influence in converting to Christianity and in
bringing within the pale of civilization." The national government tried to
"bring them to the knowledge of religion and of letters." By appropriating
their hunting grounds, government had an obligation to teach them "the arts
of civilization and the doctrines of Christianity.""ls Thomas L. McKenney,
who served as superintendent of Indian trade and head of the Office of Indian
Affairs, helped implement this policy from 1812 to 1830. Of Quaker
background, he believed in the equality of the races and cited the Bible for
support. It was his responsibility to manage missionary efforts for the
Indians."' The civilization fund lasted until 1873.
Religious missions demonstrated little interest or respect for Indian
religious beliefs. Their attack on Indian religions "and their relegating of all
his beliefs and ritual practices to the realm of superstition deprived the
missionaries of use of the Indian spiritual values and ideas as bridges to the
gospel and to acceptance of the Christian faith in terms meaningful to
Indians."'" Although some missionaries understood this, it would not be until
the 1930s that steps began to be taken to safeguard Indian religious beliefs
and practices.
II. Indian Removal
Indians on the east coast gradually lost their lands. The Treaty of Hopewell
in 1785 guaranteed the Cherokees their tribal lands, but persistent
12. Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 85, 3 Stat. 516 (1819).
13. 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 546, 1426, 1427, 1431, 1435 (1819).
14. Margaret Connell Szasz & Carnelita Ryan, American Indian Education, in 4 HANDBOOK
OF NORTH AMEmCAN INDIANS 284-300 (William C. Sturtevant ed., 1988) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK].
15. 2 RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 415-16.
16. FRANCIS PAUL PRuCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 141-42, 148-51 (1995) [hereinafter
PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER].
17. R. Pierce Beaver, Protestant Churches and the Indians, in 4 HANDBOOK, supra note 14,
at 439; see also ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., SALVATION AND THE SAVAGE: AN ANALYSIS OF
PROTESTANT MIssioNs AND AMERICAN INDIAN RESPONSE, 1787-1862 (1965).
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encroachments by white settlers led to new agreements from 1791 to 1806,
each time compensating the Cherokees for land that they had ceded to
Georgia, Tennessee, and Kentucky. In 1816, the Cherokees ceded all their
lands in South Carolina." Beginning in 1816, the governor of Tennessee
recommended that the Cherokees be relocated west of the Mississippi; those
that remained would be given 640 to 1000 acres to develop. 9
In 1821, the Creeks in Georgia agreed to cede some land, and pressure was
applied to the Cherokees to do the same. Other states and territories asked
that Indians be removed from their lands.' A Monroe message to Congress
in 1824 expressed the hope that "by the establishment of these tribes beyond
the Mississippi, their improvement in civilization, their security, and
happiness, would be promoted."'" By 1825, it appeared that whether Indians
"liked it or not, or whether they had become civilized or not," they were to
be moved.' Monroe told the Senate in 1825 that the basis for the removal
of the tribes within Georgia seemed "peculiarly strong."'
Georgia precipitated a legal crisis by withdrawing rights from Cherokees
and seizing their land. The Cherokees and church groups appealed to
Congress to reverse Georgia, but no such remedial legislation emerged.' The
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Nations, which had sponsored
missions to the Cherokees and the Choctaws, prepared a legal suit for the
Cherokee Nation.' While this case was being heard, President Jackson
persuaded Congress to pass the Removal Act of 1830, which called for the
removal of Indians to west of the Mississippi River.' After Georgia and its
judiciary put two American Board missionaries in prison, the Board took the
case to the U.S. Supreme Court. William Wirt, who had served Presidents
Monroe and Adams as Attorney General, argued the case for the Cherokees.
In 1831, the Court acknowledged that the Cherokee nation was a state with
which the United States had dealt successively by treaty. However, it ruled
that the Cherokees were not a "foreign state" and were not entitled to present
the case as one of original jurisdiction. Whatever rights the Indians possessed
regarding their lands, they were not legally positioned to ask the Court to
prevent Georgia from exercising its legislative power. Because of the form
18. Donald Grinde, Cherokee Removal and American Politics, 8 INDIAN HISTORIAN 33, 33-
34(1975).
19. REGINALD HORSMAN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIAN REMovAL, 1815-1824, at 6 (1970).
20. Id. at 12-15.
21. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 462-63 (1824).
22. HORsMAN, supra note 19, at 17.
23. 2 PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 6. at 541.
24. Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 500, 505-06 (1969).
25. BEAVER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 69.




in which the case had been submitted, the Court declined to reach the
merits.27
The dispute returned a year later, with the plaintiff this time being Samuel
A. Worcester, one of the missionaries imprisoned by Georgia. In 1830,
Georgia had passed legislation prohibiting white persons without a state
license from residing in lands occupied by the Cherokees. Worcester, one of
seven whites who defied the statute, was imprisoned along with Elizur Butler
for four years of hard labor. He argued that he entered the Cherokee nation
in the capacity of a missionary authorized by the American Board and the
U.S. President, and that his prosecution by Georgia violated several U.S.-
Cherokee treaties. Those treaty rights, he said, could not be interfered with
by any state.
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall first determined that
congressional statutes gave the Court jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Furthermore, he said that the Indian nations "had always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
fights, and the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial."'
The single exception to that status was their exclusion from intercourse with
other nations. The laws of Georgia could therefore have no force on the
Cherokee Nation unless with the consent of the Cherokees and in conformity
with treaties and congressional statutes. The law of Georgia under which
Worcester was prosecuted "is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity."
The acts of Georgia "are repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States.""
Marshall was well aware that political institutions might not comply with
his ruling. The Georgia legislature had passed a resolution warning that any
attempt by the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse the Georgia Superior Court
"will be held by this State as an unconstitutional and arbitrary interference in
the administration of her criminal laws and will be treated as such."' After
Marshall issued his decision, Georgia indeed ignored it and Jackson refused
to use federal troops to enforce the court order. It is unlikely that Jackson
said what is often attributed to him: "Well, John Marshall has made his
decision, now let him enforce it."'" The judicial process never reached the
point where it mandated Jackson to do anything.' Wirt tried to get Congress
to pass legislation that would force Jackson's hand, but was unsuccessful."
27. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
28. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
29. Id. at 561.
30. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 754 (1937).
31. Id at 759-64.
32. Id. at 764-65; Burke, supra note 24, at 525-27; Wiliam F. Swindler, Politics as Law:
The Cherokee Cases, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 7, 16 (1975).
33. JILL NOROREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: THE CONFRONTATION OF LAW AND POLITICS
123-24 (1996).
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On the crucial issue of preserving national power over the states, Jackson
looked to the Supreme Court as an ally. If Georgia could thumb its nose at
the national government, so could other states. That is what South Carolina
did on November 24, 1832, when its legislature passed the Nullification
Ordinance, part of which attacked the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court
and promised to treat any interference by the Court in state matters as a
nullity. Jackson's proclamation of December 10 strongly repudiated South
Carolina's position. In a message to Congress on January 16, 1833, Jackson
urged legislation giving federal courts additional authority to deal with the
threat from South Carolina." If South Carolina's challenge to federal judicial
authority was unacceptable, so was Georgia's. In response to Jackson's stand,
the governor of Georgia issued a pardon to the missionaries and released them
from prison.
The removal of Indians was carried out at different times, with different
tribes, and in different places over the next decade. Some Cherokees left
early. The main move in 1838 involved about 17,000 who were forced into
temporary stockades and then marched 800 miles west. Deaths from illness,
inadequate food, exposure, and trauma might have reached as high as
8,00. n Many of the deaths occurred after they arrived in Indian Territory.
The Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, and Seminoles also suffered huge losses
during the removal. In 1843, the Secretary of War reported that 89,000
Indians had been moved west and 22,846 remained east of the Mississippi
River."
I11. Grant's Peace Policy
The forced removal of Indians disrupted the work of Protestant
missionaries. American Indian missions "dwindled to dormancy.' However,
chronic corruption within the Bureau of Indian Affairs prompted President
Ulysses S. Grant to act. He appointed Ely S. Parker, a Seneca Indian,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and removed all but two of the former
superintendents of Indian schools. He relied on Quakers, who had developed
34. 3 RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 1203.
35. 3 id. at 1192-93.
36. WARREN, supra note 30, at 776.
37. NORGREN, supra note 33, at 143; see GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE
EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES OF INDIANS (1932).
38. Russell Thornton, The Demography of the Trail of Tears Period: A New Estimate of
Cherokee Population Losses, in WILLIAM L. ANDERSON, CHEROKEE REMoVAL: BEFORE AND
AFTER (1991).
39. John K. Mahn, Indian-United States Military Situation, 1775-1848, in 4 HANDBOOK,
supra note 14, at 160.





a strong trust among the Indians, to nominate superintendents and agents.4
In his first annual message on December 6, 1869, he reminded Congress that
the management of Indian affairs had long been "a subject of embarrassment
and expense." On the other hand, the Society of Friends was "well known as
having succeeded in living in peace with the Indians in the early settlement
of Pennsylvania," and had a reputation for "strict integrity and fair dealings."
With that record in mind he asked them to manage some Indian reservations,
and "the result has proven most satisfactory."'2
In 1869, Congress appropriated two million dollars to enable the President
"to maintain the peace among and with the various tribes, bands, and parties
of Indians." The statute authorized the President to create a board of
commissioners, consisting of no more than ten persons, to exercise joint
control with the Secretary of the Interior over the funds appropriated by the
statute.'3 The Board of Indian Commissioners became known as the "church
board" because its members were active laymen in the Presbyterian,
Methodist, Congregational, Episcopal, Baptist, and Friends churches." Board
members soon discovered how little power they had. By 1880, the Orthodox
Friends and the Reformed Church had withdrawn from the system.'5
The federal government entered into contracts with mission schools and
paid them an annual amount for each student enrolled. Beginning in 1881,
Roman Catholics became involved in administering Indian schools, and within
a short time expanded its number of contract schools. By 1888, the Catholic
Indian schools had become the principal beneficiaries of federal funds.
Tension between Protestants and Catholics grew worse in 1888 after Benjamin
Harrison defeated Grover Cleveland for President. One of Harrison's
appointments in 1889 was Thomas J. Morgan, a Baptist minister, to the
position of Commissioner of Indian Affairs. For Superintendent of Indian
Schools he picked the Reverend Daniel Dorchester, a Methodist clergyman.
Catholics, concerned about having two Protestant ministers in these positions,
attacked both appointees. Dorchester in 1888 had published a book called
Romanism Versus the Public School System, which called the Catholic school
system "not only un-American but anti-American." Morgan had also made
anti-Catholic statements. In 1888 he accused the Catholics of wanting to
substitute their religious schools for the public school system."
Although Protestants had pressed their religious tenets on Indians for years,
Congress now received complaints about the scope of Catholic instruction in
41. Beaver, supra note 17, at 443.
42. 9 RtcHARDSON, supra note 9, at 3992-93.
43. Indian Appropriations Act of 1869, ch. 16, § 4, 16 Stat. 13, 40.
44. Beaver, supra note 17, at 443.
45. Id at 449.
46. FRANcIS PAULPRUcIA, THECHURcHES ANDTHE INDIAN SCHOOLS, t888-1912, at 10-13
(1979).
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Indian schools. By 1888, several of the Protestant churches had decided that
it would be better to run the Indian schools without federal funds.4' The
Indian appropriations act in 1897 stated it to be "the settled policy of the
Government to hereafter make no appropriation whatever for education in any
sectarian school." Two years later, the Indian appropriations act included what
Congress called "the final appropriation for sectarian schools."4 After
congressional appropriations were eliminated, churches continued to operate
Indian schools, sometimes by relying on tribal trust funds and treaty funds.
4
For almost a century, Indian tribes had been treated as foreign nations
subject to the treaty-making power of the President and the Senate. However,
the Constitution also empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Partly
because of corruption and mismanagement in the Office of Indian Affairs, the
House of Representatives began to object to the Senate's prerogative in Indian
affairs. In 1869, the Senate added funds to an appropriations bill to fulfill
Indian treaties it had approved, but the House refused to grant the funds"
The House completed its reassertion two years later by enacting this language:
"Provided, That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty ....
The House now had coequal power with the Senate over Indian affairs.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a number of Indian religious
practices were curbed. Indian children were taken from their families and
placed in boarding schools for up to eight years, where they learned English,
wore western-style clothing, and had their hair cut western-style. Anything
Indian, including dress, language, and religious practices, were systematically
eliminated. Indian funeral ceremonies were declared illegal, and the Sun
Dance (requiring the individual to thrust a sharpened stick through his skin)
was officially banned in 1881. Some government officials and army officers
thought that every Indian dance was a war dance. Misapprehension about the
"ghost dance," which promised Indians that they could meet their dead
47. 2 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 289 (1950).
48. Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 79; Act of Mar. 1, 1899, ch. 324. 40 Stat. 924,
942; see also PETER J. RAHILL, THE CATHOLIC INDIAN MISSIONS AND GRANT'S PEACE POLICY,
1870-1884 (1953).
49. R. Pierce Beaver, The Churches and President Grant's Peace Policy, 4 J. CHURCH &
STATE 174, 189-90 (1962). In Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). the Supreme Court held
that tribal and trust funds, used to compensate Indians for lands they had ceded to the United
States, could be used to educate Indians in sectarian schools without violating the Establishment
Clause. See also ELSIE MITCHELL RUSHMORE, THE INDIAN POLICY DURING GRANT'S
ADMINISTRATION (1914).
50. FELIX COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 66 (Univ. of N.M. photo. reprint
1971) (1942).




relatives, led to tragedy. With Indians wearing ghost shirts painted with magic
symbols and moving in a hypnotic state, whites feared a major Indian
uprising. The massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890 killed two hundred or more
Indians and twenty-nine whites.'
Circulars issued by the Office of Indian Affairs from 1921 to 1923
expressed satisfaction that Indian dances were growing less frequent and had
fewer "barbaric features," but noted that on a number of reservations "the
native dance still has enough evil tendencies to furnish a retarding influence."
The Sun Dance and similar dances were considered "Indian Offences" under
departmental regulations, with "corrective penalties" provided. One of the
circulars offered a number of recommendations, including "none take part in
the dances or be present who are under 50 years of age. '3 Criticism was
also directed at dances of supposed sexual excess, such as the Hopi snake
dance.
IV. The Stirrings of Reform
Congress passed legislation in 1919 to grant citizenship to Indians who had
served in the military services during World War I and had received, or would
receive, an honorable discharge. 4 Five years later, Congress passed
legislation giving citizenship to the remaining Indians. The statute reads: "all
non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be,
and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided,
That the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or
otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property."5 Few
could miss the irony of granting U.S. citizenship to original Americans after
it had been granted to American blacks and to women.
John Collier, executive secretary of the American Indian Defense
Association, testified at House hearings in February 1923 in defense of Indian
dances. In later writings he described the dances as religious in nature and
entitled to protection along with other religions in America5 When Rep.
Scott Leavitt (R.-Mont.) drafted legislation in 1926 to empower Indian
superintendents to jail reservation Indians for six months without trial or
review, under regulations drawn up by the Interior Department, Collier
52. David E. Witheridge, No Freedom of Religion for American Indians, 18 J. CHURCH &
STATE 5, 14-15 (1976); DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1971).
53. The Denial of indian Civil and Religious Rights, 8 INDIAN HISTORIAN 43,44 (1975); see
also PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 16, at 800-06.
54. Act of Nov. 6, 1919, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 350.
55. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 253. The Dawes Allotment Act of 1887 had
granted citizenship to Indians who accepted an allotment of land and "adopted the habits of
civilized life." Dawes Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Star. 388, 390.
56. Kenneth Philp, John Collier and the Crusade to Protect Indian Religious Freedom, 1920-
26, 1 J. ETHNIc STUDIEs 22, 26-27 (1973).
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successfully fought against the bill and prevented it from being reported out
of committee.'
In 1928, the Institute for Government Research published a comprehensive
work entitled The Problem of Indian Administration. Referred to as "The
Meriam Report" because of its technical director, Lewis Meriam, the study
was highly critical of U.S. policy toward the Indians. With straightforward
language, it noted the "common failure to study sympathetically and
understandingly the Indians' own religions and ethics and to use what is good
in them as the foundation upon which to build .... The attempt blindly to
destroy the whole Indian religion may in effect be an attack on some of the
very elements of religious belief which the missionary himself espouses and
which he hopes the Indian will adopt."5 The report criticized the boarding
schools for deficiencies in diet, health conditions, overcrowding of
dormitories, overly strict discipline, and a weakening of family life."
Collier became Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1934 and remained in
that position until 1945. He helped persuade Congress to repeal a number of
obsolete laws that covered Indians.' These statutes dated back to the period
-from 1830 to 1850, when many Indians were considered hostile. For example,
the statutes prohibited the sending or carrying of seditious messages and any
correspondence with foreign nations to excite Indians to war' The repeal
statute passed without debate?'
The major piece of legislation was the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934,' which ended the land allotment provisions of the Dawes Severalty
Act of 1887.M During its forty-seven years, the Dawes Act permitted the
breaking up of tribal or reservation lands into individual allotments. The
objective, expressed piecemeal in earlier treaties, was to give Indians the
incentive to work an individual piece of property that they owned. This
philosophy took its most comprehensive form with the Dawes Act.' After
property had been allotted from a reservation, the Secretary of the Interior
could negotiate with the tribe and purchase the remaining (or "surplus") land.
As the process of allotment continued, the surplus lands were transferred to
the whites. Thus, in 1881 the Indians held 155,632,312 acres in trust. That
amount fell to 104,314,349 by 1890 and to 77,865,373 by 1900. Of the
57. Id. at 33-34.
58. INST. FOR Gov'r RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 845-46 (Lewis
Meriam et al. eds., 1928).
59. Id. at 11-14, 574-77.
60. Act of Mar. 26, 1934, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 467, 487.
61. S. RE. No. 73-634 (1934).
62. 78 CONG. Rac. 7271, 8222, 8351, 8361, 8447-48, 8607 (1934).
63. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984.
64. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 390.
65. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS: CHRISTIAN REFORMERS




remaining acres in 1900, only 5,409,530 had been allotted. The 1934
statute provided for the return of some surplus lands to tribal ownership.
Collier's draft bill contained a title on Indian education, stating the purpose
and policy of Congress "to promote the study of Indian civilization, including
Indian arts, crafts, skills, and traditions." That title, promising a step toward
the protection of Indian religious liberty, was deleted from the bill.' In
seeking funds for the sections of the bill that survived, Collier ran into
resistance from the appropriations subcommittees and the Bureau of the
Budget." What he could not obtain in legislative authority or appropriations
he tried to achieve by administrative action In 1934 he issued an order
expressing the policy of the Indian Office regarding religion:
No interference with Indian religious life or ceremonial
expression will hereafter be tolerated.... Violations of law or of
the proprieties, if committed under the cloak of any religion,
Indian or other, or any cultural tradition, Indian or other, are to be
dealt with as such, but in no case shall punishment for statutory
violations or for improprieties be so administered as to constitute
an interference with, or to imply censorship over, the religious or
cultural life, Indian or other.
The fullest constitutional liberty, in all matters affecting
religion, conscience and culture, is insisted on for all Indians:'
Federal interest in Indian affairs suffered a reverse in the late 1940s and
1950s. House hearings in 1947 focused on bills to "emancipate" Indians from
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and in that same year Acting Commissioner
William Zimmerman was directed to testify concerning the elimination of BIA
services:' In March 1949, the Hoover Commission recommended that the
Bureau of Indian Affairs be transferred from the Interior Department to a
proposed new department - the Federal Security agency - which would
handle Social Security and educational functions. Federal policy for Indians
should look to "their complete integration into the mass of the population as
full, tax-paying citizens." Pending the achievement of complete integration,
"the administration of social programs for the Indians should be progressively
transferred to State government."' Other recommendations included transfer
66. Id. at 257.
67. Lawrence C. Kelly, The Indian Reorganization Act: The Dream and the Reality, in
CONSTTUTIONALISM AND NAIVE AMERICANS, 1903-1968, at 134, 139 (John R. Wunder ed.,
1996).
68. Id. at 306-07, 308.
69. Id, at 298-99.
70. 2 STOKES, supra note 47, at 452; see KENNETH R. PHILP, JOHN COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR
INDIAN REFORM, 1920-1954 (1977).
71. Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 139, 146 (1977).
72. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcUTIvE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
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of responsibility for medical services to local governments or to quasi-public
bodies, and termination of tax exemption for Indian lands.' With these
reforms implemented, "special Federal aid to State and local governments for
Indian programs should end."74 In a dissent, Vice Chairman Dean Acheson
objected that the recommendations exceeded the commission's charter,
especially the proposal "to assimilate the Indian and to turn him, his culture,
and his means of livelihood over to State control." 5 Other dissents were
written by commissioners James H. Rowe, Jr. and James Forrestal. 6
In 1952, the House adopted a resolution calling for a full and complete
investigation of the BIA, with the goal of preparing legislation "designed to
promote the earliest practicable termination of all Federal supervision and
control over Indians."' At the end of the year, the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs issued a 1600-page report in response to the
resolution, including discussion of some of the considerations needed to be
taken into account before terminating federal supervision and control over the
Indians. For example, legislation would be needed to confer civil and criminal
jurisdiction over Indians upon State and local government authorities. '
The Eisenhower administration agreed to shift some federal responsibilities
to the states. Legislation enacted in 1953 (Public Law 280) conferred
jurisdiction on California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin with
respect to criminal offenses and civil actions committed or arising on Indian
reservations within those states."M Considering the importance of this
legislation, one would expect vigorous debate and dissent, but the legislative
history is almost barren. The measure went through the two chambers with
minimal discussion.' Although Eisenhower said he had "grave doubts as to
the wisdom of certain provisions" in the bill, he signed it. He stated that in
the five states at issue, "the Indians have enthusiastically endorsed this bill."
His objection concerned two sections of the bill that permitted other states to
impose criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian tribes within their borders,
without requiring full consultation with the Indians or final approval by the
federal government'
Consistent with this legislation, Congress passed House Concurrent
Resolution 108, stating the policy of Congress,
SOCIAL SECURITY AND EDUCATION, INDIAN AFFAIRS 65 (Mar. 1949).
73. Id. at 66.
74. Id. at 75.
75. Id. at 78.
76. Id. at 79-80.
77. 98 CONG. REc. 8788 (1952).
78. H. REP. No. 82-2503, at 30 (1952).
79. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588.
80. H. REP. No. 83-848 (1953); S. REP. No. 83-699 (1953); 99 CONG. REC. 9962-63,
10,782-84, 10,928 (1953).




as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial
limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled
to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to
other citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of
the United States, and to grant them all of the rights and
prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship.'
Similar to Public Law 280, the legislative history is practically non-existent.'
The combined effect of the concurrent resolution, Public Law 280, and tribal
termination bills is referred to as the policy of "termination."
The attempt by the federal government to disengage from Indian affairs
and transfer responsibility to the states was never tenable. Through a
combination of treaties, statutes, and formal and informal agreements, the
federal government had made commitments - legal and moral - to the
Indians. It could not, at some later date, wash its hands. President Nixon told
Congress on July 8, 1970, that the "removal of Federal trusteeship
responsibility has produced considerable disorientation among the affected
Indians and has left them unable to relate to a myriad of Federal, State, and
local assistance efforts. Their economic and social condition has often been
worse after termination than it was before."'"
V. Protective Legislation
Beginning in 1962, Congress passed a number of bills to protect Indian
religious freedom, covering such areas as eagle feathers, Indian civil rights,
Taos religious shrines, an Indian religious freedom statute, the Klamath
Indians, and the protection of Indian graves and funereal objects. Although
these statutes gave greater recognition to Indian religions, they sometimes
lacked enforcement provisions. During litigation on some of these statutory
provisions, courts regularly advise plaintiffs to seek remedies not from judicial
activism but from more explicit legislation enacted by Congress.
A. Eagle Feathers
One of the first Indian religious issues addressed by Congress concerned
legislation to protect eagles. In 1940, Congress passed a law to protect the
bald eagle, which the Continental Congress had adopted in 1782 as the
national symbol. The bald eagle, representing the American ideal of freedom,
was also threatened with extinction in the twentieth century. The 1940 statute
prohibited the taking, possession, sale, purchase, export, or import of any bald
eagle. It authorized the Secretary of the Interior to lift those prohibitions by
82. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132, B132 (1953).
83. H. REP. No. 83-841 (1953); S, REP. No. 83-794 (1953); 99 CONG. RuE. 9968, 10,815
(1953).
84. PuBuc PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1970, at 566.
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issuing permits for certain purposes, but did not specify the religious use of
Eagle feathers by Indians.' Nothing in the sparse legislative record referred
to the need to protect Indian religious practices.'
The issue returned in 1962. Congress learned that immature bald eagles,
similar in appearance to golden eagles, were sometimes killed by persons who
confused the two. Only in the fourth year does the bald eagle grow its
characteristic white feathers on the head and neck. To protect the bald eagle,
Congress extended similar protections to the golden eagle. The legislative
history explains the importance of the eagle for many Indian tribes,
particularly in the Southwest, that performed ceremonies of religious
significance. The eagle, "by reason of its majestic, solitary, and mysterious
nature, became an especial object of worship." Every tribe believed in eagle
beings, such as the man-eagle who "lays aside his plumage" after flights in
which he spreads devastation, and the hero who slays him "is carried to the
house in the sky by eagles of several species, each one in turn bearing him
higher."
The legislation authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue regulations
allowing exceptions for various reasons, including "the religious purposes of
Indian tribes."' In defining the possession and use of eagles for religious
purposes, a regulation issued in 1963 restricted permits to Indians "who are
authentic, bona fide practitioners of such religion."" Current regulations
require an applicant to be "an Indian who is authorized to participate in bona
fide tribal religious ceremonies."'
Litigation has clarified some issues. The Bald Eagle Protection Act does
not allow Indians to make commercial sales of eagles or eagle parts. Not only
is the sale of eagle parts incompatible with Indian religious beliefs, Indians
deplore the sale of eagle parts as a matter of tribal custom and religion.'
The prosecution of Indians for selling eagle parts imposes no burden on an
Indian's free exercise of religion.' These cases did not involve an exchange
among Indians of eagle parts for religious use. The people who bought the
eagle feathers were non-Indians who made it clear that they had only a
commercial interest in the items."
Indians prosecuted for shooting bald eagles sometimes cite treaties to
justify their actions. If a treaty recognized the right of Indians to hunt and
85. Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 395, 54 Stat. 250 (1940).
86. H. REP. No. 76-2104 (1940); 86 CONG. REc. 6446-47, 7006-07 (1940).
87. H. REP. No. 87-1450, at 4 (1962).
88. Eagle Protection Act Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-884, § 2, 76 Stat. 1246, 1246
(1962).
89. 28 Fed. Reg. 976, § 11.5 (1963).
90. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (c)(2) (2000).
91. United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486,487 (9th Cir. 1976).
92. M at 488.




fish within a tract of land, that right continues unless Congress abrogates or
modifies it in a subsequent statute. In 1974, the Eighth Circuit held that
nothing in the statutes or legislative histories extending protection to bald
eagles and golden eagles affected Indian hunting rights on a reservation." In
1980 the Ninth Circuit, guided in part by the Supreme Court's broad reading
of the Eagle Protection Act,95 ruled that the bald eagle statute did modify
Indian treaty rights.' The conflict between these two circuits led to a
Supreme Court ruling in 1986 that treaty rights were abrogated by the Eagle
Protection Act.' This litigation involved the taking and selling of eagles for
commercial purposes, not the religious use of eagle feathers. Other cases have
explored the use of eagle feathers and parts for Indian religious ceremonies9
On April 29, 1994, President Clinton issued a memorandum concerning the
distribution of eagle feathers for Indian religious purposes. He said that eagle
feathers "hold a sacred place in Native American culture and religious
practices," and that the administration had changed policy and procedures to
"facilitate the collection and distribution of scarce eagle bodies and parts for
this purpose."' He directed executive departments and agencies to work
cooperatively with tribal governments to accommodate Native American
religious practices "to the fullest extent under the law."m
B. The Indian Civil Rights Act
In 1968, as part of an omnibus bill providing penalties for certain acts of
violence or intimidation, Congress passed what is called the Indian Civil
Rights Act."0 Actually, it reads more like a Bill of Rights. As will any bill
of rights, the statute extends protections to individuals and imposes restrictions
on government, in this case the tribal governments. Thus, no Indian tribe
exercising powers of self-government shall "make or enforce any law
prohibiting the free exercise of religion." Because some tribes have a
theocratic foundation, an establishment of religion clause was not included.
An Establishment Clause might have worked "to the disadvantage of tribal
religion."'" Other First Amendment rights are listed, prohibiting the tribal
94. United States v. White, 508 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1974).
95. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
96. United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980).
97. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), rev'g United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261
(8th Cir. 1985).
98. United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D. N.M. 1986): United States v. Dion, 762
F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985); see John Geb, Native American Culture: The Use of Feathers as a
Protected Rights, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 105 (1974).
99. 59 Fed. Reg. 22,953 (1994).
100. Id
101. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968).
102. Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court; Indian Tribes, 1987 A. BAR FOUND. REs. J. 1,
132 (1987).
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governments from abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the
right of people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of
grievances. Indian tribes may not conduct unreasonable search and seizures,
subject persons for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy, compel
persons in a criminal case to be a witness against themselves, take private
property for a public use without just compensation, or take other actions
injurious to individual rights.
Much of the statute is directed toward safeguards of criminal proceedings,
such as the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, to be confronted with witnesses against you, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in your favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel. Other provisions prohibit excessive bail, excessive
fines, cruel and unusual punishments, the denial of equal protection,
deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law, bills of
attainder, ex post facto laws, or the denial of a trial by jury of not less than
six persons.'" The statute directed the Secretary of the Interior to draft a
model code to govern the administration of justice by courts of Indian
offenses on Indian reservations, In drafting the code, the Secretary "shall
consult with the Indians, Indian tribes, and interested agencies of the United
States."
A bill establishing rights for individuals in their relations with Indian tribes
passed the Senate on December 7, 1967, by voice vote.'" The House took
no action on that legislation, but on March 6, 1968, in a special message to
Congress on the problems of the American Indian, President Lyndon B.
Johnson urged Congress to enact a bill of rights for Indians." Two days
later the Senate passed the legislation by a vote of 81 to 0." The House
accepted the Senate language and it became law on April 11, 1968. Some
members of the Indian community did not support the legislation. They
worried that it would place an individual "against his or her society, in the
traditional judicial system they favored, which was highly religious and
required a fine sense of Indian customs."'" Also, the statute gave Indians
an opportunity to appeal to federal courts the decisions reached by tribal
courts, undercutting to some extent the principle of Indian self-
government."
103. Indian Civil Rights Act § 202. 82 Stat. at 77-78.
104. 113 CONG. REC. 35,471-77 (1967).
105. PUELC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 196869, 1, at 342.
106. 114 CONG. REC. 5835-38 (1968).
107. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CUFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE
128 (1983).




C. Taos Religious Shrines
In 1969, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported
legislation to grant to the Pueblo de Taos Indians in New Mexico trust title
to approximately 48,000 acres of federally owned land that had been taken
from the Indians in 1906, by presidential order, without payment of any
compensation. Congress had passed legislation in 1933 to give the Pueblo a
fifty-year special use permit to the area," but the Taos Indians wanted a
more permanent arrangement. Placing great significance on the land, they
urged the government to return the title to the land rather than compensate
them with money. The Indians argued that preservation of the area and
placing limits on non-Indian use were essential in protecting religious interests
and the sacredness of the land. The integrity of their religion required
complete privacy."' The most sacred shrine in the area is the Blue Lake.
To explain the successful enactment of legislation in 1970, one study
emphasized that "nothing was more important than the persistent
determination of the Taos people themselves."' Taos delegations traveled
throughout the United States to promote their cause, enlisted the support of
many individuals and organizations, and allowed a television documentary to
be made at the Pueblo and at Blue Lake."'
On the choice between payment and conveying land, the committee
concluded that "the equities are on the side of the Indians" and that the land
should be restored to the Pueblo."' The bill passed the House in 1969 by
voice vote, with little opposition."" On July 8, 1970, President Nixon
"wholeheartedly" endorsed the legislation "as an important symbol of this
government's responsiveness to the just grievances of the American
Indians."" 5 Sen. George McGovern (D.-S.D.) put the emphasis more on
religious liberty:
Mr. President, what is involved here is far more than simply
a legal claim, important as that is. What really is involved here
is a deeply spiritual and religious matter, which goes right to the
heart of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience in our
country, because the Blue Lake area which is in dispute, and
which has been in dispute for so many years, is regarded as the
109. Act of May 31, 1953, ch. 45, § 4, 48 Stat. 108, 109 (1933).
110. H. REP. No. 91-326, at 2 (1969).
111. John J. Bodine, Blue Lake: A Struggle for Indian Rights, I AM. INDIAN L. REV. 23, 24
(1973).
112. Id at 28.
113. H. REP. No. 91-326, at 3.
114. 115 CONG. REC. 24,871, 24,878-86 (1969).
115. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDEMs, 1970, at 569.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
most sacred of all places by the Indian people, and particularly
the Taos Pueblo Indians.
' 6
After two days of debate, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 70 to 12 and
it became law.' 7
Other legislation by Congress during this period strengthened Indian
autonomy. In 1975, Congress granted Indians greater participation in federal
programs and increased educational assistance. The Indian Self-Determination
Act recognized that prolonged federal domination of Indian service programs
"has served to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people.""
'
D. American Indian Religious Freedom Act
In 1978, Congress passed a joint resolution expressing the principles of
religious freedom for Indians. The resolution, called the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA),"' begins by recognizing that freedom of
religion is an "inherent right" for all people and "fundamental to the
democratic structure of the United States." Moreover, the individual right to
practice religion has produced "a rich variety of religious heritages in this
country." Included within this culture are the religious practices of the
American Indian, "such practices forming the basis of Indian identity and
value systems." After citing the instances in which federal laws and practices
had abridged and infringed on the religious freedom of American Indians, the
legislation resolves that "henceforth it shall be the policy of the United States
to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom
to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American
Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to
access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to
worship through ceremonials and traditional rites."" Section 2 of the
resolution provides that the President "shall direct" the various federal
departments, agencies, and other instrumentalities to evaluate their policies
and procedures, in consultation with native traditional religious leaders, in
order to determine appropriate changes necessary to "preserve and protect
Native American religious cultural rights and practices."
* The resolution expresses only a general policy and lacks enforcement
mechanisms. As the floor manager in the House said: "It has no teeth in
it..'' Still, it demonstrates an awareness and sensitivity to Indian religious
freedom that would not have been expressed by Congress (or any other
116. 116 CONG. REc. 39,331 (1970).
117. See S. REP. No. 91-1345 (1970); 116 CONG. REc. 39,327-38, 39,586-610 (1970).
118. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638,
§ 2, 88 Stat. 2203, 2203 (1975).
119. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978).
120. L, 92 Stat. at 469.




branch of government) in previous years. The legislative history is quite brief.
The resolution passed the Senate by voice vote and by a margin of 337 to 81
in the House.'" Two years later, the Tenth Circuit decided a case originally
brought in 1974 but one that also cited the resolution. The complaint claimed
that in impounding water to form Lake Powell on the Colorado River, the
government had put some of the Navajo gods under water, denied the Navajo
access to a prayer spot sacred to them, and by allowing tourists to visit the
Rainbow Bridge permitted desecration of the site. Balancing the government's
interest in assuring public access to natural attractions, the court denied that
the free exercise of Indian religions had been infringed.'
Similarly, in 1980 the Sixth Circuit ruled that the Cherokee Indians failed
to show that their free exercise of religion would be infringed by a proposed
dam that would flood a site sacred to the Cherokee religion. The plaintiffs
cited AIRFA. The court noted that Congress, in an appropriations bill enacted
in 1979, had directed the construction of the dam notwithstanding the
Endangered Species Act "or any other law."'" The record convinced the
court that the dam affected not religious interests but rather cultural heritage
and tradition, which are not protected by the Free Exercise Clause.
In a 1983 case, Navajo and Hopi tribes challenged a permit that would
allow private interests to expand and develop a government-owned ski area
in Arizona, claiming that it impaired their ability to gather sacred objects and
to conduct religious ceremonies. The D.C. Circuit held that development of
the area did not violate AIFRA or the National Historic Preservation Act. In
reviewing the statutory language and legislative history of AIRFA, the court
concluded that they do not indicate "the extent to which Congress intended
that policy to override other land use considerations."1' The court cited this
statement by one of the bill's principal sponsors, Rep. Morris Udall (D.-Ariz.):
"[l1t is not the intent of my bill to wipe out laws passed for the benefit of the
general public or to confer special religious rights on Indians."'' Prior to
issuing the permit, the government held meetings with Indian religious
practitioners and conducted public hearings on the Hopi and Navajo
reservations, at which the practitioners testified. 27 Also in 1983, the Eighth
Circuit reviewed a case brought by Indian spiritual leaders and religious
practitioners, claiming that South Dakota, by restricting access to a site of
traditional religious ceremonial grounds, had violated the Free Exercise
Clause, AIRFA, and other statutes. The district court held that Indian interests
122. S. REP. No. 95-709 (1978); H. REP. No. 95-1308 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. 8365-66,
21,443-46, 21,450-52 (1978).
123. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
124. Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1161 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 953 (1980).
125. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
126. id.
127. Id. at 747.
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had been outweighed by compelling state interests, and the Eighth Circuit
agreed.
In 1988, the Supreme Court decided that the federal government did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause by permitting timber harvesting and
construction of a road through a portion of a national forest that has
traditionally been used for Indian religious purposes. After a study
commissioned by the Forest Service concluded that construction of the road
would cause "serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an
integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest
California Indian peoples," the government selected a route that was removed
as far as possible from the sites used by Indians for spiritual activities.'
Indian organizations claimed that the Forest Service's decision violated the
Free Exercise Clause and several statutes, including AIRFA. Although the
Court recognized that the logging and road-building "could have devastating
effects on traditional Indian religious practices," it denied the Indians' claim
because "government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy
every citizen's religious needs and desires."'" Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor noted that the Constitution
does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the various
competing demands on government, many of them rooted in
sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society
as ours. That task, to the extent that it is feasible, is for the
legislature and other institutions. Cf. The Federalist No. 10
(suggesting that the effects of religious factionalism are best




O'Connor said that the dissenting Justices wanted the Court to referee
disputes between the government and religious groups by deciding which
public lands are "central" or "indispensable" to certain religions, and to weigh
the value of religious beliefs that are threatened by a government program.





Twice in the 1980s Congress passed legislation to recognize the rights of
Klamath Indians in Oregon. In 1980, a private law set aside in special trust
status certain lands in the Winema National Forest for Edison Chiloquin. As
128. Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
129. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 442-43 (1988).
130. d. at 451, 452.
131. M. at 452.




part of the "termination" policy in the 1950s, federal supervision over
Klamath Indian property came to an end. Adult members of the tribe were
given the option of holding their interests in common under Oregon law or
converting the interests to cash. In a 1958 election, approximately 77% of the
tribal members voted to sell their property. Edison Chiloquin wanted to retain
his interests in the land. As a result of the election, 631,000 acres were sold
to a private corporation (91,000 acres), the Department of the Interior
(15,000), and the Department of Agriculture (525,000).'"
In 1969, a majority of the remaining members of the tribe elected to
terminate the trust. Legislation in 1973 directed the Secretary of Agriculture
to acquire 135,000 acres of land to be added to the Winema National
Forest." Purchase of the land resulted in the disbursement of $270,000 to
each Indian beneficiary. Chiloquin, who had helped create the "Committee to
Save the Remaining Klamath Indian Lands," refused to accept the money.
Instead, he wanted land to establish a village founded on traditional values
and the preservation of Indian culture, ways, and spiritual beliefs. To
underscore his determination, he built a tipi in the forest, became a squatter,
and kept a sacred council fire lit.
The purpose of the private bill for Chiloquin was to avoid, as Sen. Mark
Hatfield (R.-Or.) said, "confrontation and all other kinds of unpleasantries of
trying to expel this man from the lands that are his ancestral home. 'ISS The
bill specifies that the land set aside for Chiloquin "shall not be inconsistent
with its cultural, historical, and archeological character." If the land were used
by Chiloquin or his heirs for other than "traditional Indian purposes," it would
revert to the United States to protect archeological, cultural, and traditional
values associated with the property."
There remained some unfinished business with the Klamaths, long
recognized by the federal government as an Indian tribe. However, in 1954,
as part of the termination policy, Congress passed legislation terminating
federal supervision over the tribe and putting an end to federal services to
tribal members. The Termination Act gave members a choice of either
withdrawing from the tribe and taking their share of the sale of land in cash,
or remaining with the tribe and keeping their share in trust.'" In reporting
legislation in 1986, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs said
that the government had never properly asked tribal members whether they
were in favor of the 1954 bill. In fact, the tribe had voted to send a slate of
133. Background on the Edison Chiloquin Bill comes from H. RP. No. 96-1406 (1980).
See also GARREIT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 49-52 (2001).
134. Act of Aug. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-104, 87 Stat. 349.
135. 126 CONG. REc. 30,379 (1980).
136. Priv. L. No. 96-68, 94 Stat. 3613 (1980).
137. Act of Aug. 13, 1954, 68 Stat. at 719.
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delegates to Congress to state their opposition to the bill.' Legislation in
1986 restored federal recognition of the Klamath Indian Tribe. Rights and
privileges that may have been lost because of the 1954 statute were restored.
Any federal services and benefits given to Indian tribes recognized by the
federal government are also to be given to the Klamath Indians.'
F. Indian Graves and Funereal Objects
Native Americans, believing that they have a spiritual connection with
ancestral remains, have had little success in litigating disputes about
development of Indian burial grounds, removal of gravestones by developers,
or malicious disturbance of Indian tombs or graves." While it can be said
that "only recently" have Native Americans "felt they were in a position to
bring a white government to court,"' 4 the more effective avenue has been
to bring white government to Congress.
In 1989, Congress passed legislation to establish the National Museum of
the American Indian within the Smithsonian Institution. Part of the statute
required the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, in consultation and
cooperation with traditional Indian religious leaders and government officials
of Indian tribes, to inventory the Indian human remains and Indian funerary
objects in the possession or control of the Smithsonian Institution, and to
return to the descendants or tribes the human remains and associated funerary
objects that can be associated with the descendants and tribes."2
The following year, Congress passed the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act.'43 In reporting the bill, the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs explained its purpose: "to protect
Native American burial sites and the removal of human remains, funerary
objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony on Federal, Indian
and Native Hawaiian lands."'" Persons who excavate or do archeological
work on federal lands would have to receive a permit. If any human remains
or funerary objects were discovered, and it is known which tribe is closely
related to them, that tribe is given the opportunity to reclaim the remains or
objects. If they decide not to take possession, the Secretary of the Interior will
determine the disposition after consulting with Native American, scientific and
138. H. REP. No. 99-630, at 3.
139. Act of Aug. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-398, 100 Stat. 849 (1986). For floor debate, see
132 CONG. REc. 13,753-55, 21,775-76 (1986).
140. Wana the Bear v. Community Const., Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 423 (Ct. App. 1982); State
v. Glass, 273 N.E.2d 893 (Ohio 1971); Newman v. State, 174 So.2d 479 (Fla. 1965); Carter v.
City of Zanesville, 52 N.E. 126 (Ohio 1898).
141. June Camille Bush Raines, One Is Missing: Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: An Overview and Analysis, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 639, 646 (1992).
142. Act of Nov. 28, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-185, § 11, 103 Stat. 1336, 1343 (1989).
143. Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990).




museum groups. In previous years, Indian tribes had tried to have the human
remains and funerary objects of their ancestors returned to them. During
consideration of the legislation, some Indian representatives testified that the
spirits of their ancestors would not rest until they had been returned to their
homeland.'
The bill passed the House under suspension of the rules, a procedure
usually adopted for uncontroversial legislation with strong bipartisan
support.'" It requires a two-thirds majority. Rep. Ben Nighthorse Campbell
(D.-Colo.), whose father was Northern Cheyenne, discussed an order by the
Surgeon General in 1868 to have Army field officers send him Indian
skeletons. The purpose of the study was to determine whether the Indian was
inferior to the white man, because of a smaller cranium, and to show that the
Indian was not capable of being a landowner." Indian tribes wanted to
recover these and other remains. The bill passed the Senate by voice vote,
with little debate.'" Differences between the two chambers were resolved
with little difficulty." As enacted, the bill provides for criminal penalties
for those engaged in illegal trafficking in Indian human remains and cultural
items."
VI. Religious Use of Peyote
Indians have had a few victories in state court in using peyote during
religious ceremonies, but most judicial rulings have gone against them,
including the highly disputed decision by the Supreme Court in Employment
Division v. Smith.' Support for peyote use has come from the regular
political process: federal agency regulations, testimony by executive officials,
Justice Department opinions, state legislation, and congressional statutes.
A. Peyotism
The peyote religion among Indian tribes in the United States begins at the
end of the nineteenth century, although its use by Indians in other territories
dates back 10,000 years. Peyote grows in small buttons at the top of a
spineless cactus. With its hallucinogenic properties, peyote offers a
supernatural alternative to other religions by establishing an intermediate spirit
(peyote, Jesus, or both) and a Supreme Being (the Great Spirit or God).'
145. Id. at 13.
146. 136 CONG. REc. 31,941 (1990).
147. Id. at 31,937.
148. Id. at 34,061-62.
149. Id. at 35,677-81, 36,814-15.
150. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act § 4, 104 Stat. at 3052.
151. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
152. George de Verges, Peyote and the Native American Church, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 71
(1974); H. REP. No. 103-675, at 3 (1994); see also OMER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A
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As practiced by the Native American Church (NAC), the drug is considered
a sacrament (like bread and wine) and an object of worship. Prayers are
devoted to peyote just as prayers are devoted to the Holy Ghost. By ingesting
peyote, members of the NAC say they enter into direct contact with God.
Peyote is not injurious to the Indian religious user, is not addictive or habit
forming, and is often helpful in controlling alcoholism and alcohol abuse
among Indian people.'53
Initially, the states responded to peyote by forbidding its use. In 1899,
Oklahoma prohibited use of the mescal bean but repealed the law in 1908.'"
Other states enacted legislation to prohibit the use of peyote: Colorado,
Nevada, and Utah in 1917, Kansas in 1920, Arizona, Montana, North Dakota,
and South Dakota in 1923, Iowa in 1924, New Mexico and Wyoming in
1929, and Texas in 1937 Iss This legislation had little application for peyote
used on Indian reservations, where states had no jurisdiction. Enforcement
could come on state property or state highways. In 1926, the Supreme Court
of Montana held that under some circumstances the state could enforce the
state law prohibiting peyote against an Indian who uses it within a
reservation."
Congress had prohibited the sale of intoxicating drinks to Indians in
1897 2" In 1918, the House Committee on Indian Affairs reported legislation
to prohibit the sale of peyote to Indians. The committee, accepting the
recommendation of the Indian Bureau and relying on published articles,
described peyote as "poison" and referred to "night orgies in a close [sic] tent
polluted with foul air."'" The bureau recognized that peyote was used by
Indians "as a substitute for intoxicating liquors," but instead of using that
evidence to support the use of peyote, the committee argued that substitution
was a ground to prohibit it.' The reason behind this position is that action
on the peyote bill was caught up in the national campaign for prohibition in
general, eventually leading to ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in
1919. Curiously, the committee report includes an encyclopedia article that
accurately describes peyote as "producing a pleasant dreaminess without,
however, overmastering the will power," and states that peyote "effectively
checks tendencies toward alcoholism." "
HISTORY (1987).
153. H. REP. No. 103-675, at 3.
154. Omer C. Stewart, Peyote and the Law, in CHRISTOPHER VECSEY, HANDBOOK OF
AMERICAN INDIAN REuIous FREEDOM 60 (1991).
155. de Verges, supra note 152, at 77 n.14.
156. State v. Big Sheep, 242 P. 1067 (Mont. 1926).
157. Act of Jan. 30, 1897, ch. 109, 29 Stat. 506.
158. H. RFP. No. 65-560, at 26 (1918).
159. Id. at 2.




The House passed the committee-reported bill to prohibit the sale of
intoxicating liquor, Indian hemp, or peyote to any Indian. An amendment to
permit the sale of peyote when used for religious purposes was rejected, and
the bill as a whole passed. 6' The Senate took no action on this House bill.
Instead, it debated an amendment to prohibit the introduction of peyote into
Indian territories. The amendment was rejected on a point of order because
it constituted general legislation on an appropriations bill."
The religious use of peyote was also opposed by some tribal leaders, who
considered it a threat to their authority.'" In 1962, the D.C. Circuit affirmed
the action of the Secretary of the Interior in approving a resolution adopted
by the Navajo Tribal Council, banning the sale, use, or possession of peyote.
NAC had challenged the resolution, considering peyote as indispensable for
their religious ceremonies, but the Navajo Tribal Council regarded peyote as
not connected with "any Navajo religious practice" and harmful and foreign
to the Navajo traditional way of life.'"
B. Reform Movement
Montana in 1957 and New Mexico in 1959 amended their narcotic laws to
provide that the prohibition against narcotics "shall not apply to the
possession, sale or gift of peyote for religious sacramental purposes by a bona
fide religious organization incorporated under the laws of the state."'" In
1959, the Tenth Circuit decided a case brought by NAC, which sought an
injunction against an ordinance adopted by the Navajo tribal council making
it an offense to introduce peyote into Navajo country. The Navajos entered
the house of an NAC member while he conducted religious ceremonies, and
without a search warrant searched the premises and arrested several people.
The NAC claimed that the ordinance was void because it violated the church's
rights and the rights of its members under the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The court held that in the absence of
a constitutional provision or a congressional statute making the Bill of Rights
applicable to Indian nations, federal courts lacked jurisdiction over tribal laws
or regulations.'"
In 1960, an Arizona trial court ruled against the state in a case involving
a Navajo woman arrested for illegal possession of peyote. The court held that
her religious interests outweighed whatever governmental interest the state
could present. The judge wrote that the use of peyote was "essential to the
existence of the peyote religion. Without it, the practice of the religion would
161. Id. at 11113-15.
162. 56 CONG. REc. 4129-33 (1918).
163. de Verges, supra note 152, at 72.
164. Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
165. People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 819 (Cal. 1964).
166. Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
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be effectively prevented."'67 The state appealed, but the Arizona Supreme
Court affirmed the holding of the trial judge.'"
Several years later, in 1964, the California Supreme Court reached a
similar result in People v. Woody. State police arrested a group of Navajos
who used peyote during a religious ceremony and they were convicted under
a state statute that prohibited the unauthorized possession of peyote. The court
ruled that since the defendants used peyote "in a bona fide pursuit of a
religious faith," and since there was no compelling state interest to override
that use, application of the statute in this instance violated the First
Amendment. Although the First Amendment was not applicable to Indian
nations (and would not be until 1968), it applied to the states." The court
explained that peyote serves a sacramental purpose similar to bread and wine
in certain Christian churches, but "it is more than a sacrament. Peyote
constitutes in itself an object of worship; prayers are directed to it much as
prayers are devoted to the Holy Ghost. On the other hand, to use peyote for
nonreligious purposes is sacrilegious."'7
Although the California Supreme Court accepted the religious use of
peyote in Woody, two years later a California trial court rejected an
individual's argument that he had a religious right to plant, cultivate, and
smoke marijuana. He was not a member of any organized religion. What he
called religion was his "own personal philosophy and way of life," unlike the
religious practices of the Native American Church and the established use of
peyote as a sacrament.' In 1969, a California appellate court upheld the
conviction of someone who said he used marijuana "for meditative
communication with the Supreme Being." The court found no similarity
between the use of marijuana in this case and the NAC's use of peyote as an
object of worship."
In 1966, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided another kind of peyote
case. Someone who called himself a "Peyotist with Buddhist leanings" and
a member of the Neo-American Church (unrelated to the Native American
Church) claimed that his use of peyote and marijuana was protected by the
First Amendment. The Neo-American Church was incorporated in California
in 1965, its head is Chief Boo Hoo, and the members (Boo Hoos) join the
organization to take psychedelic drugs as sacramental foods and
"manifestations of the Grace of God."" Although there was some doubt that
167. CAROLYN N. LONG, RELIGious FREEDOM AND INDIAN RIGHTS 18 (2000).
168. Neither decision in this case, Arizona v. Attakai, Criminal No. 4098, Coconino County,
was reported, but it is cited in Woody, 394 P.2d at 813 n.5.
169. Woody, 394 P.2d at 815.
170. Id at 817; see also In re Grady, 394 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1964) (insisting that the religious
use of peyote must be honest and bona fide).
171. People v. Mitchell, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884, 887-88 (1966).
172. People v. Collins, 78 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1969).




this member of the Neo-American Church used drugs solely for religious
purposes, the court held that the First Amendment did not protect even sincere
users. Religious beliefs are protected, but not religious acts that "constitute
threats to the public safety, morals, peace and order." 4
Other cases decided during this period also went against the use of drugs
for supposedly religious reasons. In 1968, a federal court rejected the
argument of a Neo-American Church member who claimed that her ingestion
of marijuana and LSD was required for a religious experience. The court held
that the statutes under which she was indicted were rational, constitutional,
and served a substantial government interest. Her case involved more than the
personal use of drugs; she was also indicted for unlawful sale and
delivery."5
These cases in the 1960s were decided either by state courts or lower
federal courts. The case that went to the Supreme Court and received
nationwide attention concerned Timothy Leary, who championed the use of
drugs as a psychedelic, mystical, and religious experience. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed his conviction against his claim of a First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion. Like some of the cases already discussed, Leary was not
charged with merely using marijuana. He was convicted of transporting and
concealing the drug. His daughter Susan, age 18, was also convicted under
the transportation and concealment charges. He testified that he was aware
that his failure to pay a transfer tax for the marijuana violated federal law.'76
The court rejected any similarity between his actions and the use of peyote
upheld in Woody." Unlike the California law that prohibited the religious
use of peyote, the court ruled that Congress had a compelling governmental
interest in passing laws against marijuana.
Leary's conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court because of issues
concerning self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and questions of
due process. His religious freedom argument was not at issue, nor was there
any question about the compelling need of the national government to control
marijuana. The Court closed by saying: "[niothing in what we hold today
implies any constitutional disability in Congress to deal with the marihuana
traffic by other means."'
None of these cases challenged Woody's support for Indians using peyote
in a religious ceremony conducted by the NAC. In 1972, when that identical
issue was before an appellate court in Arizona, the court upheld the use of
peyote in a religious ceremony (a wedding) convened by the Native American
Church. Peyotism, said the court, "is not a twentieth century cult nor a fad
174. State v. Bullard, 148 S.E.2d 565, 569 (N.C. 1966).
175. United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968).
176. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 856 n.7 (5th Cir. 1967).
177. Id. at 861.
178. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 54 (1969).
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subject to extinction at a whim."" Like the California court in Woody, the
court held that Arizona had failed to show a compelling state interest in
prohibiting the use of peyote as part of a religious ceremony. The trial record
showed that peyote is not a narcotic and is not a habit-forming substance."'"
The appellate court remarked: "The fact that the use of peyote will not result
in addiction is crucial because the State would have a great interest in
protecting its citizens from drug abuse.""'' In deciding a peyote case in
1974, the Ninth Circuit agreed with much in Woody without actually
embracing it as federal law."'
Going against these cases was an Oregon decision in 1975. The state
police, after arresting an individual for failure to have a driver's license,
discovered peyote during a search. Convicted of unlawfully possessing
mescaline, or peyote, he was not given an opportunity to present evidence of
his religious beliefs or his membership in the Native American Church. The
Court of Appeals of Oregon affirmed his conviction."
In 1977, an Oklahoma appellate court reviewed an Indian's conviction for
possessing peyote. When arrested, he had a string of peyote buttons around
his neck and other peyote buttons wrapped and tied in a handkerchief inside
his pocket. At trial, he testified that he was a member of the Otoe Tribe, the
Ponca Tribe and the NAC. He admitted to possessing peyote, but said it was
used for religious ceremonies and not for illicit drug purposes. The past
president of the NAC of Oklahoma testified that it was permissible for
members to carry peyote as a religious symbol. Several people told the trial
court that the defendant was a member of the NAC. The appellate court ruled
(1) that the defendant was a member of the church, (2) his possession of
peyote "was and is protected," and (3) the state had failed to show a
compelling interest in preventing NAC members from possessing and
transporting peyote within the state.'"
C. Federal Controls
Federal actions during this period also seemed to secure the religious use
of peyote by NAC members. Congress passed a drug abuse act in 1965,
leaving to the administration broad discretion in makirig exemptions for
depressant or stimulant drugs. The House bill had provided the NAC with a
specific exemption for peyote, but the Senate - and the enacted bill - left
179. State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950, 952 (Ariz. 1973).
180. Id at 954.
181. It
182. Golden Eagle v. Johnson, 493 F.2d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 1974).
183. State v. Soto, 537 P.2d 142 (Ore. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); see John
T. Doyle, Dubious Intrusions - Peyote, Drug Laws, and Religious Freedom, 8 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 79 (1980).
184. Whitehorm v. State, 561 P.2d 539, 547 (Okla. 1977); see Robert Johnston, Whitehorn




that issue to administrative regulation."u The following year, the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs listed a number of drugs that had a
depressant effect on the central nervous system, including mescaline and its
salts and peyote. The notice in the Federal Register explains that the listing
of peyote "does not apply to non-drug use in bona fide religious ceremonies
of the Native American Church; however, persons supplying the product to
the Church are required to register and maintain appropriate records of
receipts and disbursements of the article.""
In 1978, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of the Justice
Department issued a notice to discuss implementation of a federal regulation
that specifically exempted NAC members from the registration requirement -
under the Controlled Substances Act - for the use of peyote in bona fide
religious ceremonies." The purpose of the notice was not to rescind or
reduce the exemption, but rather to discuss the difficulty of identifying bona
fide church members and to search for ways of preventing unauthorized
persons from taking advantage of the exemption. In 1981, the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) of the Justice Department released an opinion expressing its
view that the DEA regulation exempting peyote use in connection with NAC
religious ceremonies accurately reflected congressional intent."'
The special exemption for NAC members has been challenged by other
churches that want to use peyote in their religious ceremonies. The Church
of the Awakening, a non-Indian religious body, asked a federal court to add
its name in the Code of Federal Regulations along with the NAC. In 1972;
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the federal regulation was arbitrary in
classifying the NAC one way and other churches another way, but said it
would be equally arbitrary to place the NAC and the Church of the
Awakening in one category and all other churches in another."9 In 1984, the
Fifth Circuit received another challenge to the special exemption, this time
from the Peyote Way Church of God. The court remanded the case to the
district court to determine whether the federal regulation denied religious
freedom to the Peyote Way Church." When the case returned, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the special exemption for the NAC on the grounds that
Congress had been given extraordinary authority over Indian matters and the
special exemption was rationally related to the legitimate governmental
objective of preserving Indian culture."9 '
185. 111 CONG. REC. 14,608 (1965); Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-74, 79 Stat. 226.
186. 31 Fed. Reg. 4679 (1966). The peyote exception for the NAC currently appears in 21
C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2001).
187. 43 Fed. Reg. 56,106 (1978).
188. 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 403 (1981).
189. Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1972).
190. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 742 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1934).
191. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thomburgh. 922 F,2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991).
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In 1979, a federal district court in New York read the peyote exception
differently. In addition to the NAC, it ruled that the exception covered the
Native American Church of New York, which is not affiliated with the NAC
and only a few of its roughly one thousand members are Indians. Also, the
Native American Church of New York expresses a belief that all psychedelic
drugs, including LSD and marijuana, are deities." The district court
concluded that the exemption for peyote is available to any bona fide religious
organization that uses peyote for sacramental purposes and regards peyote as
a deity.""
D. The Case of Al Smith and Galen Black
Alfred Smith, a Klamath Indian and member of the NAC, served as a
counselor for alcoholics since 1971. He worked for ADAPT (Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment) from August 25, 1982, until his
discharge on March 5, 1984. ADAPT required counselors to abstain from
alcohol and mind-altering drugs and warned Smith that he could be discharged
for using peyote, even if part of a religious ceremony. After ingesting peyote
during a weekend service conducted by the NAC, Smith was fired and
subsequently denied unemployment benefits because of the drug use."
In 1986, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the denial of benefits did
not violate state constitutional provisions regarding freedom of worship and
religious opinion, but it did violate the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.'" It relied on the standards announced
in 1963 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner. the person claiming
the free exercise right must show that the application of law "significantly
burdens" the free exercise of religion, and the state must show that the
constraint on religious activity is the "least restrictive" means of achieving a
"compelling" state interest." A companion case involved Galen Black, a
non-Indian who belonged to the NAC. He was also denied unemployment
benefits after being fired for ingesting peyote during a religious ceremony.
Under Oregon law, the possession of peyote was a crime. Unemployment
benefits could be denied when an employee was discharged for misconduct,
in this case by ingesting peyote. Although the state defended the law as part
of its general policy against drug use, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the
state had not shown that the financial stability of the unemployment insurance
192. Native Am. Church v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd,
633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980).
193. ld. at 1251.
194. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res., 721 P.2d 445, 445-46 (Or. 1986).
195. Id at 446-49.




fund would be "imperiled by claimants applying for religious exemptions if
this claimant receives benefits.l" 97
Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, took the case to the U.S.
Supreme Court. In 1988, the Court vacated the Oregon ruling and returned
the case with the request that the Oregon Supreme Court decide whether the
religious use of peyote was legal in that state. The U.S. Supreme Court
pointed out that the results reached in Sherbert and other unemployment
benefits cases "might well have been different if the employees had been
discharged for engaging in criminal conduct." ''
The Oregon Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier ruling by holding that the
First Amendment entitled Smith and Black to their unemployment benefits.
The state court pointed out that when Congress passed the Drug Abuse
Control Amendments of 1965, for the purpose of bringing peyote under
federal control, it expected the implementing regulation to exempt the
religious use of peyote. In 1970 and 1978, Congress passed additional
legislation offering support for the peyote religion. " As anticipated by
Congress, the implementing regulation issued in 1971 stated that the listing
of peyote as a controlled substance "does not apply to the nondrug use of
peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church."'
The Oregon Supreme Court therefore sought guidance from a range ofjudicial
and nonjudicial sources: its own state constitutional heritage, rulings from the
U.S. Supreme Court, constitutional judgments from Congress, and legislation
from other states that provided some type of exemption for the sacramental
use of peyote."'
Frohnmayer defended the state's interest in controlling drugs. Few
regulatory areas, he said, invoke governmental interests in public health and
safety "with force equal to that of drug use." Few drugs trigger that interest
"with strength equal to that of hallucinogens, such as peyote."' Although
some state courts had held that the federal Free Exercise Clause protects the
use of peyote by NAC members, Frohnmayer pointed to contrary rulings by
the Oregon courts.a
197. d at 451.
198. Employment Div., Dept of Human Res. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 671 (1988).
199. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res., 763 P.2d 146, 149 (Or. 1988).
200. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2001).
201. Smith, 763 P.2d at 148 n.2.
202. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, Smith v.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res., 763 P.2d 146, 149 (Or. 1988), in 196 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 426 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1991) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS].
203. Brief for Petitioners, in 196 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 202, at 478 n.26 (citing
State v. Soto, 537 P.2d 142 (Or. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976) (upholding the
prohibition of mescaline even for religious purposes)).
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In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause
permits a state to prohibit sacramental peyote use and to deny unemployment
benefits to persons discharged for such use. In Employment Division v. Smith,
delivered by Justice Scalia, the Court ruled that state law may prohibit the
possession and use of a drug even if it incidentally prohibits a religious
practice, provided that the state law is neutral and generally applicable to all
individuals.' Under this test, there was no need for the state to show a
compelling interest or to use the least restrictive means. The issue of
abandoning the compelling interest test was not before the Court. It was
neither argued nor briefed. Scalia acknowledged that his test would place
religious minorities at the mercy of the political process, but discriminatory
treatment was an "unavoidable consequence of democratic government."'
In fact, discriminatory treatment is often the consequence of judicial rulings,
with remedies coming from democratic institutions.
E. Legislative Remedies
With the judiciary offering no relief, interest groups turned their attention
to legislative remedies in Congress and Oregon. A bill introduced in Congress
in 1990, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),' was drafted to
reinstate the Sherbert standard for protecting religious liberties. Congressman
Stephen Solarz took the lead in crafting the bill, working in concert with the
National Council of Churches and other religious groups. It was agreed that
the objective should be to restore Sherbert and there should be no focus on
the sacramental use of peyote. Otherwise, the legislation would become
known as "a drug bill."'
The effect of Scalia's decision in Smith was already being felt in the lower
courts. When a Laotian immigrant died and a medical examiner insisted on
performing an autopsy, the individual's parents protested on religious grounds
(animism) that autopsies were abhorrent mutilations of the body that prevented
the spirit from being set free. In January 1990, before Scalia's ruling, a
district judge sustained their position, but after Scalia's decision the judge
announced with "deep regret" that the Supreme Court's opinion forced him to
deny their claim.' Other restrictions on religious liberty flowed from
Scalia's decision.'
While Congress considered this proposal, the Oregon legislature repaired
some of the damage of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision by enacting a bill
204. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
205. Id. at 890.
206. The bill was passed in 1993 as Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.
207. LONG, supra note 167, at 213.
208. Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990); You Vang Yang v. Stumer, 28 F.
Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990).
209. Ruth Marcus, Reins on Religious Freedom? Broad Coalition Protects Impact of High




that protects the sacramental use of peyote by the Native American Church.
The state bill was sponsored by Rep. Jim Edmunson and assigned to the
judiciary committee on which he served."' Al Smith testified in favor of the
bill, advising the committee that the "drug we have to worry about is
alcohol."2" Frohnmayer's office took no position on the bill."' As enacted
in 1991, the bill states that in any prosecution for the manufacture, possession,
or delivery of peyote, it is an affirmative defense that the peyote is being used
or is intended for use (1) in connection with the good faith practice of a
religious belief, (2) as directly associated with a religious practice,'and (3) in
a manner that is not dangerous to the health of the user or others who are in
the proximity of the user."3
After the introduction of RFRA in 1990, a broad coalition of religious and
civil liberties groups worked closely to overturn Smith. Congressional
hearings in 1992 explored the authority of Congress to enact legislation to
overturn the Supreme Court on constitutional issues. Congressman Henry
Hyde, a senior member of the House Judiciary Committee, argued that
Congress had no authority to enact RFRA: "Congress is institutionally unable
to restore a prior interpretation of the first amendment once the Supreme
Court has rejected that interpretation. We are a legislature, not the Court. 2t'
Yet throughout its history, Congress has often countermanded the Court on
constitutional issues. Scholars and lobbyists at the hearings testified strongly
that Congress had a right and a duty to act when the Court endangers
fundamental freedoms. Robert Dugan, Jr., representing the National
Association of Evangelicals, said that the Supreme Court, intended to be a
guardian of constitutional freedoms, has "deprived us of" our birthright as
Americans" and emptied the Free Exercise Clause of its meaning. The system
of checks and balances, he said, empowered Congress "to overrule the Court
by restoring the compelling interest test."2ts Dallin H. Oaks, from the
Mormon Church, regarded the statutory restoration of the compelling interest
standard as "both a legitimate and a necessary response by the legislative
branch to the degradation of religious freedom resulting from the Smith
case."' Nadine Strossen of the ACLU appealed to Congress to act:
IThe Supreme Court has cast us back into the good graces of this
legislature, and it does depend on you, our elected representatives,
210. Legislator Will Introduce Bill to Protect Peyote'r Sacred Use, EUGENE REGISTER
GUARD, Apr. 20, 1990, at 5B.
211. Panel Listens to Peyote Testimony, STATESMAN J. (Salem, Or.), Apr. 6, 1991, at D1.
212. EpPs, supra note 133, at 235.
213. 1991 Oregon Laws ch. 329, § I (codified at OREGON REV. STAT. 475.992, § 5 (1995)).
214. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings Before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 7 (1992).
215. L at 10, 14.
216. Id. at 25.
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to restore to all of us the religious freedom that should be
protected by the Constitution but that the U.S. Supreme Court has
refused to protect that way. Please restore our religious liberty
through legislation 7
Progress continued in the Senate, where one witness at hearings called
Smith "the Dred Scott of first amendment law. ""2 ' Stalled for two years,
RFRA began to move in 1993 when the House Judiciary Committee, voting
35-0, ordered the measure reported. The bill was designed to create a
"statutory right" to require the compelling governmental interest test in cases
in which the free exercise of religion has been burdened by a law of general
applicability."" For constitutional authority to pass the bill, the committee
pointed to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Necessary and
Proper Clause embodied in Article I, Section 8. Congress could provide
"statutory protection for a constitutional value when the Supreme Court has
been unwilling to assert its authority."m The House bill did not mandate
that all states permit the ceremonial use of peyote; it merely subjected any
prohibition to the compelling interest test." The bill passed the House under
suspension of the rules, which requires a two-thirds majority.'
The Senate Judiciary Committee, by a vote of 15-1, reported RFRA for
floor consideration,m  and the bill passed 97-3.' As enacted, RFRA
provided that governments may substantially burden a person's religious
exercise only if they demonstrate a compelling interest and use the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. The term "government" applied
to any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official at the federal,
state, and local level.'
A year after enacting RFRA, Congress passed legislation to permit the use
of peyote by Native Americans during religious ceremonies.' As Sen. Paul
Wellstone (D.-Minn.) remarked, leaving the definition of standards for
religious freedom "up to the judiciary has not proven very effective for native
American religions."m Patrick H. Lefthand, a member of the Kootenai tribe,
217. Id. at 64-65.
218. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 42 (1992) (statement of Oliver S. Thomas, general counsel, Baptist
Joint Committee on Public Affairs).
219. H. REP. No. 103-88, at 1-2 (1993).
220. Id. at 9.
221. Id. at 7.
222. 139 CONG. REc. 9680-87 (1993).
223. S. REP. No. 103-11, at 2 (1993).
224. 139 CONG. REc. at 26,416.
225. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 5, 107 Stat. at 1488.
226. American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344,
109 Stat. 3125.




told the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs that the Supreme Court decided
that "our religion did not deserve the same protection afforded to all
Americans who practice Judeo-Christian religions," and urged Congress to
pass legislation "to ensure the continuation and vitality of Indian
communities. "m
The peyote bill that became law in 1994 originally attempted to redress a
number of Supreme Court decisions that gave short shrift to Indian religious
rights. In addition to Smith, the bill responded to the Court's decision in 1988
that denied protection of an Indian religious site on public land.' Senate
hearings disclosed that RFRA "fails to clearly address the fundamental issue
of native access to sacred sites."' Sen. Daniel Inouye (D.-Haw.), sponsor
of the legislation, explained that the bill would provide "protection of native
American sacred sites and puts into place a mechanism for resolving
disputes.""' Sen. Mark Hatfield (R.-Or.) said it was important that the 1988
decision "not be allowed to continue to deny native American input into
Government actions that might affect historically sacred sites. ' "" This part
of the legislation was never enacted. However, President Clinton issued an
executive order in 1996 to direct executive branch agencies to (1)
accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian
religious practitioners and (2) avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity
of such sacred sites."
DEA officials testified that the religious use of peyote by Indians has
nothing to do with the vast and violent traffic in illegal narcotics in the United
States. The DEA was also unaware of the diversion of peyote to any illicit
market.' The bill enacted in 1994 specifically recognizes that "for many
Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a
religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and
significant in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures.""' s The statute also
notes that the Supreme Court's decision in Smith did not protect Indian
practitioners who used peyote in Indian religious ceremonies.'
228. Native American Free Exercise of Religious Freedom Act: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong. 98-99 (1993).
229. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
230. 139 CONG. REc. 10,971 (1993) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
231. kl. at 10,963.
232. I at 10,970.
233. Exec. Order 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (1996).
234. H. REP. No. 103-675, at 4 (1994).
235. American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994 § 2, 108 Stat. at 3125
(amending the American Indian Religious Freedom act of 1978 by adding section 3(a)(1)).
236. ld § 3(a)(4).
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F. Constitutional Review of RFRA
Early in 1995, a district court in Texas held RFRA to be unconstitutional
on the grounds that it violated the doctrine of separation of powers by
"intruding on the power and duty of the judiciary.""7 That decision was
overturned a year later by the Fifth Circuit. The executive and legislative
branches, said the appellate court, "also have both the right and duty to
interpret the constitution."" The Fifth Circuit referred to a section from
Smith where Justice Scalia seemed to invite other branches to protect rights
left unguarded by the courts." 9 In that sense, RFRA was consistent with
Scalia's appeal to nonjudicial bodies to enhance rights and liberties beyond the
minimum levels established by courts. Other courts also upheld the
constitutionality of RFRA.'
In 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded the scope of its
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting
RFRA.UI In many ways, Congress had asked for a black eye by attempting
to reimpose a constitutional standard (Sherbert v. Verner) that the Court had
specifically rejected in Smith."z The Court could not sit still and have
Congress ram Sherbert down its throat. But the reasoning and premises in the
decision are superficial, unpersuasive, and internally inconsistent. They invite
continued challenges and legislative activity. Although the Court strongly
hinted that it has the last and final word in deciding the meaning of the
Constitution, it in fact left the door wide open for future congressional
action. 3
237. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 357 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
238. Flores v. City of Boeme, Tex., 73 F.3d 1352, 1356 (5th Cir. 1996).
239. Id. at 1362 ("Values that are protected against government interference through
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process. Just as a
society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment is
likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a
society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be
solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.") (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
240. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,470 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Abordo v. Hawaii,
902 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Hawaii 1995); Sasnett v. Dep't of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D.
Wis. 1995), affd, Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996); Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F.
Supp. 510 (D. Hawaii 1995). In 1996, a district court in Maryland held that RFRA usurped the
Supreme Court's authority to determine the scope and meaning of the First Amendment and
violated the separation of powers. Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp.
591 (D. Md. 1996).
241. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
242. See Neal Devins, How Not to Challenge the Court, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645
(1998).
243. For a critique of Boerne, see Louis Fisher, Nonjudicial Safeguardvfor Religious Liberty,




The Court warned about the risks of congressional action. "If Congress
could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning,
no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means."'2" There is no intelligible distinction between what
Congress does by statute and what the Court does by caselaw in changing the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both are done outside the amendment
process. The Court inserted some unintended humor with this grave
admonition: "Shifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and
effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained
in Article V" The same result flows from Court decisions that reflect
shifting judicial majorities or changes in the way that a Justice analyzes an
issue. As Professor Michael McConnell has written, "'shifting legislative
majorities' have no greater and no less capacity than shifting judicial
majorities to 'circumvent' the amendment process of Article V.' " Two days
before the Court invalidated RFRA, it overruled a decision from 1985 that had
limited federal assistance to parochial schools.'
The Court concluded with the suggestion that constitutional interpretation
is a judicial monopoly. "Our national experience teaches that the Constitution
is preserved best when each part of the Government respects both the
Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the other branches.
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the
province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law
is."'" Nothing in two hundred years of constitutional practice and
construction supports such a static formulation. The Court closes its eyes to
what is plainly conspicuous in American history: the reality and capacity of
all three branches and the general public to participate in shaping
constitutional values, either before or after judicial rulings.
A separate question concerned the constitutionality of RFRA as applied not
to the states but to the federal government. In 1998, the Eighth Circuit held
that RFRA was constitutional as applied to federal law, it did not violate the
separation of powers doctrine, and it did not violate the Establishment
Clause.m " In 2001, the Tenth Circuit ruled that RFRA was a legitimate
congressional action under Article I to govern the conduct of federal prison
officials.'
244. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
245. Id
246. Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne
v. Flores, Il1 HARV. L. REV. 153, 174 (1997).
247. Agostini v. Felton, 524 U.S. 402 1997 (1997), rev'g Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985).
248. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36.
249. In re Young, 141 F.3d 854(8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, sub nom. Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 525 U.S. 811 (1998).
250. Kikurnura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001).
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Following Boerne, the House Judiciary Committee held hearings to
consider alternative legislation. Rep. Robert Scott (D.-Va.) said that RFRA
could be reconfigured by relying on the Interstate Commerce Clause or the
Spending Clause." The Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings in 1997
to explore the legislative options available to Congress."1 The following
year, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah) introduced the Religious Liberty Protection
Act (RLPA) to respond to Boerne. He relied primarily on the commerce and
spending powers.' A similar bill, which passed the House the following
year, was supported by ninety-two religious and civil liberty groups, including
Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, and Native American organizations.'
The bill stated that a government shall not "substantially burden" a person's
religious exercise (1) in a program or activity, operated by a government, that
receives Federal financial assistance or (2) in any case in which the
substantial burden on religious exercise affects commerce with foreign
nations, among the states, or with Indian tribes."s With Smith in mind, the
bill provided that this principle applies "even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability."'  Finally, the bill permitted government to
substantially burden a person's religious exercise if the government can
demonstrate that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and
is the least restrictive means to further that interest. s7 The bill passed the
House by a vote of 306-118."
By the time the bill cleared both chambers in 2000, it had been restricted
to provide two kinds of protections. First, it offers religious groups protection
in land-use disputes, such as zoning issues (the kind that triggered Boerne).
Second, the statute makes it easier for prisoners and other persons confined
in state-run institutions to practice their faith. The statute applies to any
organization that receives federal money, including state and local prisons that
get federal construction and maintenance funds. Finally, the statute relies on
congressional power over interstate commerce, because construction materials
are shipped between states for the renovation of buildings owned by religious
organizations.'
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VII. Conclusions
The public's broad involvement in basic constitutional questions of
religious liberty underscores why it is impracticable and misleading, on both
political and legal grounds, to look automatically (and optimistically) to the
courts for the protection of minority rights. The Indians found victory not in
courtrooms but in legislative chambers. They prevailed because they were
effective in working with many other interest groups in safeguarding rights
that were unobtainable from the courts. They prevailed because their case was
sound and they persisted in the face of many setbacks. The statutory rights
they won, both from Congress and state legislatures, are far more secure than
any favorable judicial ruling they might have received.
Beyond the issue of peyote, Congress has passed many pieces of legislation
to protect Indian religious freedom. The judiciary has sometimes played a
significant role, but most of the initiative and momentum comes from Indian
groups and other organizations that apply pressure to political institutions:
Congress, the President, federal agencies, and the states. Religious liberty for
Indians has been secured by the regular political process, not by judicial
rulings.
I A review of judicial holdings on Indian religious liberties reveals a few
victories and many, many defeats. Indians have brought their religious
grievances to the Supreme Court repeatedly, coming up empty on every
occasion. What they were unable to achieve through litigation they were often
able to achieve though legislation, such as the religious use of peyote and
various claims for sacred sites. To draw attention to cases in which courts do
not protect the rights of religious minorities is not meant to criticize the
judiciary. The American system works quite well when courts limit their
reach and decline to manufacture new rights. Other political institutions, both
at the national and state level, have greater legitimacy and competence to step
in and right a wrong. Rather than expect courts to always deliver a remedy,
it is healthier to have that task shared with democratic institutions.
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